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A B S T R A C T
A systematic and theoretically informed analysis of how extractive industries affect health outcomes and health
inequities is overdue. Informed by the work of Saskia Sassen on “logics of extraction,” we adopt an expansive
definition of extractive industries to include (for example) large-scale foreign acquisitions of agricultural land for
export production. To ground our analysis in concrete place-based evidence, we begin with a brief review of four
case examples of major extractive activities. We then analyze the political economy of extractivism, focusing on
the societal structures, processes, and relationships of power that drive and enable extraction. Next, we examine
how this global order shapes and interacts with politics, institutions, and policies at the state/national level
contextualizing extractive activity. Having provided necessary context, we posit a set of pathways that link the
global political economy and national politics and institutional practices surrounding extraction to health out-
comes and their distribution. These pathways involve both direct health effects, such as toxic work and en-
vironmental exposures and assassination of activists, and indirect effects, including sustained impoverishment,
water insecurity, and stress-related ailments. We conclude with some reflections on the need for future research
on the health and health equity implications of the global extractive order.
1. Introduction and rationale
The contemporary global order, and associated human activity,
depends on acquisition and transformation of vast quantities of material
resources, most notably by way of what are conventionally referred to
as extractive industries: mining, oil, and gas. The commercial transac-
tions and value chains that connect and convert raw materials into
finished products span the globe, exemplified by the use of cobalt
mined in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in mobile phones
assembled in China and Korea; the phones, like virtually all electronics,
incorporate many other components sourced from multiple countries,
and are in turn sold to consumers worldwide, although ownership of
many products is more widespread among higher income consumers.
On one estimate, 80% of world trade involves commodity or value
chains controlled by transnational corporations (TNCs) (UNCTAD,
2013).
Increasingly, a range of resource-based economic activities well
beyond minerals and fossil fuels are taking on a similarly extractive
character, such as sand mining for roads and construction in distant
locales and large-scale foreign acquisition of arable land for purposes of
exporting crops (“land grabs”)—and the water used in their production.
Like conventional mining, oil, and gas extractive industries, land and
sand grabs and similar activities are intrinsically and inescapably place-
specific because of the fixed location of the resources being extracted or
appropriated. The various activities in question are connected by
homologous “logics of extraction” (Sassen, 2014)—Saskia Sassen's
conceptual rubric that draws, in turn, from David Harvey's earlier
concept of “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey, 2003).1 In
keeping with Sassen's work and the emergence of “neoextractivism” as
a description of both the redistributive possibilities and the constraints
on resource development in the context of left-leaning governments in
Latin America (e.g. Cáceres, 2015; North and Grinspun, 2016), we
adopt a broader than usual definition of extraction, covering agri-
cultural land, water, and sand, and addressing not only the acquisition
of these resources, but also the institutional and political processes that
make acquisition possible. In other words, we define extraction both as
physical and economic activities and as social relations characterized
by “power asymmetries,” together critical elements for understanding
the equity dimension of global governance for health (Gill and Benatar,
2016; Ottersen et al., 2014).
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What do these activities have do with health? Hypothetically, rev-
enues and royalties from a well-managed extractive sector could be
used to improve health outcomes and reduce inequities via redistribu-
tion to equitably improve living conditions, including through invest-
ments in health care systems (Ridde et al., 2015). In this regard, Nor-
way's management of its extraction-related wealth stands out: its
governance approach seeks to ensure long-term, equitable social ben-
efits from its petroleum resources (Ramírez-Cendrero and Wirth, 2016).
However, Norway's approach is more an anomaly than the rule. Re-
source revenue flows can have the opposite effect if wealth is con-
centrated and financial gains are subject to corruption and illicit fi-
nancial flows that avoid taxation and reduce governments’ fiscal
capacity, in turn exacerbating inequalities.
Moreover, the extractive sector and associated activities are fre-
quently linked to a host of direct and indirect negative health effects.
These include workplace exposures, environmental contamination, and
resource depletion, with the latter two also leading to reduction or loss
of livelihoods. Large-scale foreign acquisitions of land for export-or-
iented agriculture may result in diminished food sovereignty and water
security. Dispossession and displacement associated with large-scale
resource development can give rise to stress-related health effects, in-
cluding those resulting from the material effects of lost livelihoods and
accompanying spiritual and cultural violation of sacred natural re-
sources, especially for Indigenous populations, who are often subject to
extraction-related degradation and dispossession. Repression of re-
sistance to such displacement and the destructive effects of extraction
has increasingly involved violence against objectors, including rape and
targeted killings.
Research on the health implications of extraction tends to be case-
specific and focused on proximal effects rather than on social de-
terminants of health: conditions of life and work that affect health
outcomes and health (in)equities, and the underlying “inequitable dis-
tribution of power, money, and resources—the structural drivers of
those conditions of daily life” (Commission on Social Determinants of
Health, 2008, p. 2; see also Birn et al., 2017, chapters 7, 9; Kelly and
Doohan, 2012). A few correlational studies link extractivism and health
based on panel data (Cotet and Tsui, 2013; El Anshasy and Katsaiti,
2015), but these are politically disembodied, omitting or simplifying
political economy framings and variables and conspicuously failing to
consider effects on within-country health inequities. By contrast, a
broader body of social scientific work on extractive industries fore-
grounds issues of political economy, and we draw on it extensively in
our analysis, reflecting the insight of iconoclastic epidemiologist Nancy
Krieger that “analysis of causes of disease distribution requires atten-
tion to the political and economic structures, processes and power re-
lationships that produce societal patterns of health, disease, and well-
being via shaping the conditions in which people live and work”
(Krieger, 2011, p. 168, emphasis in original; see also Birn et al., 2017, p.
92–95 and chapter 7). We focus on societal (political, economic, social,
cultural) as well as biological, physical, and chemical influences on
health and illness, with an emphasis on macro-scale processes and
power differentials. At the same time, it is essential not to regard the
social and the biological as distinct realms, but rather as parts of an
integrated whole in which social and biological influences interact
(Rodríguez, 1994; Blane et al., 2013; Kelly et al., 2014).
To ground our analysis in concrete place-based evidence, we launch
the analysis with brief case examples of four leading forms of extrac-
tion. We then analyze the political economy of extractivism, focusing
on the societal structures, processes, and relationships of power that
drive and enable extraction. Next, we examine how this global order
shapes and interacts with politics, institutions, and policies at the state/
national level contextualizing extractive activity. Having provided ne-
cessary context, we posit a set of pathways that link the global political
economy and national politics and institutional practices surrounding
extraction to health outcomes and their distribution. These pathways
involve both direct health effects, such as toxic work and environmental
exposures and assassination of activists, and indirect effects, including
sustained impoverishment, water insecurity, and stress-related ail-
ments. We conclude with some reflections on the need for future re-
search and on the importance of systematic attention to the health
implications of the global extractive order in the context of ongoing
development imperatives.
2. Case examples of extraction
Our illustrations of the political economy nexus and pathways
linking extraction to (ill) health are drawn primarily from four geo-
graphically diverse case examples of extractive processes, two of them
region-specific and two global in scope: a) mining in Latin America; b)
oil and gas extraction in the Gulf of Guinea region of Africa; c) global
land and water grabs; and d) the lesser-known case of sand mining.
a) Mining is one of the world's most lucrative industries. Most
countries carry out some form of mining, with extractive TNCs active on
all continents and mining a major global source of health and social
injustice (Morrice and Colagiuri, 2013). As of December 2017, the
world's 50 largest mining transnationals were collectively worth $896
billion by market capitalization (Els, 2017). Even when identified re-
sources are not exploited, the highly competitive junior exploration
firms that scout locales generate lasting environmental damage, for
which they are typically not held liable because they operate outside
the scope of royalty agreements and environmental regulations
(Dougherty, 2013).
Latin America is the top destination for mining-related foreign
direct investment (FDI), instantiating the long, global political economy
tentacles of the “undergoverned extractive” sectors (Dávila, 2009;
Gordon and Webber, 2016). Since the 1990s, Latin America has ex-
perienced one of the largest mining booms in history (Heidrich, 2016),
a resurgence of the region's mineral (mis)fortunes that began under
Iberian colonial exploitation (Galeano, 1971). Indeed, this mining bo-
nanza, propelled by Canada (Working Group, 2014), continues today
even after declines in global mineral commodity prices and despite
questionable benefits for host countries, some of which even subsidize
TNC activities (Helwege, 2015). This situation offers a window into a
number of political economy of health issues relevant to mining (and
other extractive industries) elsewhere, as well as a clear illustration of
the role of the World Bank and export credit agencies in promoting
extractive industries as a development strategy, often with scant regard
for the deleterious impact on the environment, health consequences, or
the rights of displaced populations (Hatcher, 2014; Munarriz, 2008;
Szablowski, 2007).
b) The dependence of the world economy on oil and gas is axio-
matic; these account for roughly half of world energy consumption.
From oil drilling underground and offshore, through refining into liquid
fuels (gasoline and diesel), and transport over long distances via pipe-
lines, trains, tankers, and trucks, there are multiple potential health
hazards: spills, leaks, collision-related fires, and the “flaring” of gas at
the wellhead (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2015).
Oil production in the Gulf of Guinea region began with the dis-
covery of oil in Nigeria by a partnership between British Petroleum (BP)
and what is now Royal Dutch Shell in 1956. Subsequently, and espe-
cially in the first decade of the 21st century, interest in oil development
in sub-Saharan Africa increased for both economic and geopolitical
reasons: high oil prices and the desire of the United States, in particular,
to lessen dependence on Middle Eastern oil. The major oil transna-
tionals active in the region are Royal Dutch Shell, France's Total, US-
based Chevron and ExxonMobil, and Italy's AGIP (Soares de Oliveira,
2007, p. 160), with the usual mode of operation involving partnership
with a state-owned national oil company. Among other hazards, re-
peated oil spills over decades have made the Niger Delta one of the
world's most polluted locales, destroying farming and fishing liveli-
hoods, exacerbating poverty, and exposing millions of people to water
contaminated with carcinogens (UNEP, 2011).
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c) Another form of rapidly expanding extractive activity involves
“land and water grabs,” which have a complex provenance. Rapid
increases in the price of food on global markets in 2007–2008 threa-
tened to undo much of previous decades’ modest progress in reducing
undernutrition and food insecurity in low- and middle-income countries
(LMICs) (Dawe and Drechsler, 2010; Masonet al., 2011; Ortiz et al.,
2011; Prain, 2010; Ruel et al., 2010). Concerns about food security2 in
food importing countries, focus on agricultural land as a profitable in-
vestment, and growing demand for biofuels as a substitute for fossil
fuels drove a rapid acceleration in large-scale transnational acquisitions
of arable land and the associated water resources (Buying farmland
abroad, 2009; D'Odorico et al., 2017; Dell'Angelo et al., 2017a;
Dell'Angelo et al., 2018).
According to the most reliable estimate, since 2000 approximately
49.3 million hectares of land—more than three times the agricultural
land area of the United Kingdom—has been acquired by foreign in-
vestors (including those linked to or supplying a handful of large food
and beverage conglomerates) and the governments of food-importing
countries (Land Matrix, 2017). This phenomenon has been described as
a “wide-ranging global ‘land reform’—in this case, a regressive land
reform where governments take land from the poor and give (or sell or
lease) it to the rich” (White et al., p. 620). Because production and
export of crops involves substantial use (and thereby export) of water,
the effect is a large-scale “virtual water trade” (Carr, et al., 2013;
Hoekstra and Mekonnen, 2012; Tamea et al., 2013) in which agri-
culture plays a central role as the consumer of 70% of the world's fresh
water (World Water Assessment Programme, 2017).
d) A neglected but rapidly evolving extraction crisis involves sand
mining. Global consumption of sand as a commodity surpasses 40
billion tons per year (UNEP, 2014). Sand is used in the production of a
multitude of consumer products and is also used in hydraulic fracturing
(“fracking”) to extract natural gas and oil. But the biggest consumer of
sand (and more broadly of aggregates—a combination of sand, gravel,
and crushed stone) is the construction industry. Sand is a key ingredient
of concrete and asphalt; concrete is the most consumed resource by
volume in the world, after water.
Rapid urban growth and the associated construction and real estate
booms of both high- and middle-income economies (Padmalal and
Maya, 2014; Pereira and Ratnayake, 2013), which are closely tied to
global flows of finance (see e.g. Gaffney, 2015; Goldman, 2011; Levien,
2013; Stockhammer, 2012), are driving the soaring demand for sand.
The construction industry is expected to grow by 85% by 2030, led by
three countries: China, India, and the USA (Global Construction
Perspectives, 2015). Not surprisingly, these countries are also among
the top sand-importing countries in the world (UN Comtrade Analytics,
2016). The building frenzy of Arab Gulf States, such as Qatar and Ku-
wait, also make these small countries major sand importers despite
their proximity to desert sand.3 To meet this demand, sand is mined,
often illegally, from beaches and inland sand dunes and dredged from
river and ocean floors around the world—in settings as distinct as Sri
Lanka, Cambodia, Italy, Ghana, and the USA (California)—at a level of
intensity that far exceeds the natural replenishment rate (UNEP, 2014).
3. Political economy of extractive industries, I: The social,
political, economic, and historical context of global extraction
Nothing is new about large-scale transnational resource extraction
for economic gain. The exploitation of place-specific resources by
powerful interests is a recurring theme in world history: the Spanish
and Portuguese conquest of the Americas in search of gold, silver, and
other precious metals; the succession of staple commodities that laid
the foundation for Canada's prosperity; and the exploitation of colonial
rubber plantations in “British” Malaya and the “Belgian” Congo
(Hochschild, 1998) are just three of myriad historical examples. Un-
dergirding the extractive imperialist enterprise were military invasion
and occupation, slavery and forced displacement of Indigenous popu-
lations, and labour exploitation on the part of colonial powers, all with
deadly consequences for those colonized.
Complex border-crossing value chains are likewise not a recent
phenomenon. During the transatlantic triangular slave trade, which was
well established by the middle of the 17th century, European textiles,
weapons, alcohol, and metals were shipped to West Africa and sold or
bartered for over 11 million Africans, who were captured, enslaved, and
transported to the Americas and the Caribbean; 12–15% died in the
“middle passage.” At these destinations, this human “cargo” was sold or
exchanged for agricultural goods produced by other enslaved labourers.
The agricultural products were then transported to British, French,
Dutch, and Portuguese ports on the same vessels that were once again
laden with European commodities to repeat the profitable and deadly
circulation of labour, raw materials, and manufactured goods (Walvin,
2015).
With today's resurgence of extractive activity and at a time of in-
creasing concern with the broader societal determinants of health, a
systematic and theoretically informed analysis of how extractive in-
dustries—using our more expansive definition—affect health outcomes
and health inequity is overdue (see Fig. 1). Many cultural, technolo-
gical, and economic factors combine to influence the forces driving
resource extraction and its health consequences, but one stands out:
global capitalism. Accelerating in the postwar consumer era, market-
and profit-driven growth—accompanied by militarism and magnified
by neoliberal globalization since the 1980s—has generated ever-
growing demand for all sorts of goods, with little regard for the health,
environmental, and resource depletion consequences.
The context of global extraction also reveals the role of particular
players and associated power asymmetries. TNCs, government policies,
and market demand (notably including the demand associated with
military technologies; see Quinn, 2015) are at the centre of intensified
extraction, and some of the production and consumption patterns that
make it economically and politically rewarding. Meanwhile, those
suffering the consequences of extraction are disproportionately located
in (territorially or socially defined) peripheries (cf. Robinson, 2002).
Although workers and consumers necessarily participate in this nexus,
they do not control it or the global arrangements that sustain it, and the
poorest—wherever in the world they are located—benefit the least.
This constitutes what might be called extractive injustice.
A key component of the power asymmetries that characterize global
capitalism (and their influence on health) is the role of international
financial institutions (IFIs), most notably the World Bank. The Bank has
advocated for extractive sector investment on the questionable pre-
sumption that this would generate the needed revenues to fund coun-
tries’ social and economic development plans (see e.g. World Bank,
1992). In some cases, financing for land grabs has been provided by the
World Bank through the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the
unit that lends at market rates (Daniel and Mittal, 2010; White et al.,
2012); between 2010 and 2016 alone, the World Bank Group financed
$8.7 billion in mining, oil and gas investment (World Bank, 2017). A
multinational investigation (International Consortium of Investigative
Journalists, 2015) found that between 2004 and 2013 World Bank-fi-
nanced projects in a range of sectors (e.g., transportation, water and
2 Food (and nutritional) security refers to availability and accessibility of sufficient
quantities of (nutritious) food. Because patterns of agricultural production, ownership,
and distribution often exacerbate nutritional insecurity —since small agricultural pro-
ducers are frequently displaced by agribusiness TNCs, and non-nutritious food may be
distributed by aid donors or promoted by TNCs— food sovereignty has emerged as a
grassroots-driven contestation to the notion of food security. Food sovereignty refers to
autonomous decisions regarding production and consumption of food, respecting both
socio-cultural norms and the preservation of smallholder production as the best antidote
to food insecurity (see e.g. Patel, 2009; Fairbairn, 2010). We are grateful to Ryan Isakson
for pointing us to these sources.
3 The rounded shape of desert sand makes it inadequate for construction uses as the
grains do not effectively bind together (Welland, 2009).
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sanitation, agriculture, forestry, energy and mining, health services,
education, finance, and others) displaced 3.4 million people, either
physically (by forcing them from their homes and/or land) or eco-
nomically (by harming their livelihoods). And in his 2017 report, the
United Nations Independent Expert on the promotion of a democratic
and equitable international order (de Zayas, 2017) noted evidence that
World Bank-supported companies have been engaged in land grabbing,
forced displacements, child labour, and environmental destruction and
contamination, among other unacknowledged health-destructive ac-
tions.
As important from a health perspective is an international order that
creates hospitable havens for flight capital: financial centres that pro-
vide opportunities for tax avoidance, for both individuals and TNCs,
and rarely make inquiries about the origin of assets (Curtis and Jones,
2017; Garcia-Bernardo et al., 2017; Harrington, 2016). These havens
are of course also immensely profitable for the financial services in-
dustry, as revealed by the network of offshore transactions exposed by
the Panama and Paradise papers (International Consortium of
Investigative Journalists, 2017a, b). Africa is one of the world's regions
with the highest percentage of private wealth held outside its borders;
only Russia and the Persian Gulf states rank higher (Zucman, 2014, p.
140), and the availability of safe offshore havens is a prerequisite for
routine appropriation of billions of dollars of resource revenues by
political elites (see e.g. Agbese, 2015; Page, 2016 on Nigeria and
García-Rodríguez et al., 2015; Onishi, 2017; Redvers, 2012 on Angola).
A 2015 report found that from 2000 to 2010 “[m]ore than half (56.2
per cent) of the IFFs [illicit financial flows] from the African continent
over the period come from oil, precious metals and minerals, ores, iron
and steel, and copper” (High Level Panel, 2015, p. 97). This pattern of
capital flight deprives economies of desperately needed resources for
investing in development, including in poverty reduction measures and
comprehensive and equitable health systems (Collier, 2008; Ndikumana
and Boyce, 2011; Nkurunziza, 2015).
4. Political economy of extractive industries, II: politics,
institutions, and policies
It is important, first of all, to recognize that the current global order
did not “just happen.” It is, in fact, best understood as the outcome of a
complex political project (Harvey, 2006; Marchak, 1991) in which
governments and political elites have acted to promote what is now
referred to as globalization (Halperin, 2013, especially chapter 8) or,
more pointedly, the neoliberal phase of global capitalism (Wood,
1999). More concretely, the power structures, rules, and imperatives
undergirding extraction as a prime and long-term feature of global
capitalism shape and interact with national-level politics, institutions,
and policies that promote and facilitate extraction (Fig. 1). These in-
clude fiscal policies around incentives for exploration; royalty rates for
natural resource extraction; taxation of incomes from the extractive
sector; and (inadequate) control of capital outflows, as well as less
formalized dimensions of complicity, corruption, and accountability
gaps. An additional layer of policies involves such factors as corporate
governance practices (e.g. regarding bona fide “corporate social re-
sponsibility” and transparency); regulations and enforcement (or their
absence); (lack of) recognition of Indigenous rights to land and subsoil
resources; and (lack of) legal/judicial recourse, including at the inter-
national level, in the event of human rights violations by extractive
industries or governments that facilitate their activities. Not all of these
can be explored here.
The larger extractive order also integrates local activities that op-
erate on the sidelines of TNCs. As commodity prices rose in the first
decade of the 2000s, small-scale informal (artisanal) mining also ex-
panded, often on the outskirts of large mines or at abandoned sites, in
turn feeding into larger corporate supply chains. For example, in the
DRC, which supplies more than half the world's cobalt, some 40,000
child artisanal miners scavenge for cobalt in discarded rocks from in-
dustrial mines, sometimes supporting their families where livelihoods
have been disrupted. A subsidiary of China-based Huayou Cobalt is
among the largest companies that purchases artisanally-mined cobalt,
processing it to sell to the world's largest electronics TNCs (Amnesty
International, 2016).
This is the context for the so-called “resource curse” in which re-
source-rich economies are claimed to underperform relative to others on
growth and, especially, social indicators (for non-technical overviews see
Gary and Karl, 2003, pp. 21–24; Karl, 1999; Siegle, 2009). The petro-
states of sub-Saharan Africa are often held to exemplify this phenom-
enon. A recent review of the resource curse literature concludes “there is
strong evidence that one type of resource wealth—petroleum—has at
Fig. 1. Schematic of the political economy of global extraction and health (adapted from Birn et al., 2017).
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least three important effects: It tends to make authoritarian regimes more
durable; it leads to heightened corruption; and it helps trigger violent
conflict in low- and middle-income countries, particularly when it is
located in the territory of marginalized ethnic groups” (Ross, 2015, p.
240; see also Siegle, 2009 on the high correlation between hydrocarbon
resource endowments and autocracy, and Williams and Le Billon, 2017
on the complex interactions between politics and power in natural re-
source contexts). Indeed, in the sub-Saharan context the enclave char-
acter of the associated extractive and industrial activity (Ferguson, 2005;
Le Billon, 2005, p. 6; Shaxson, 2007, p. 1133) involves minimal benefit
to the local economy, as noted in the next section of the article.
However, much of the resource curse literature treats not only
resource endowments but also political institutions and allegiances
as largely endogenous to the countries in question (Haarstad, 2016).
An alternative view, applicable to a range of resource-based econo-
mies, foregrounds the interaction between the international poli-
tical-economic and institutional environment and domestic politics.
Arguably, predatory political regimes in oil-producing countries
“survive not because of the conservatism of an international society
unwilling to acknowledge their dereliction, but because of the net-
works of international complicity that underpin them” (Soares de
Oliveira, 2007, p. 59). Elements of that complicity include tolerating
and even supporting the repressive policies of national governments,
such as the stifling of opposition to the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline
by both governments (Horta, 2012). The lack of international action
following the Nigerian military dictatorship's 1995 execution of anti-
Shell Ogoni activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Indigenous
Ogoni campaigners (Henshaw, 2015) and later harassment by the
civilian government of litigants opposed to gas flaring are further
examples of this complicity.
More generally, the opportunity for huge financial gains also creates
opportunities for corruption, especially in the form of patronage net-
works and rent-seeking, that are central to the operation of the resource
curse and affect health through various, mainly indirect, pathways
(Kolstad and Søreide, 2009; Le Billon, 2011). On one hand, Siegle
(2009) argues that international institutions can incentivize domestic
accountability and disincentivize autocratic rule (a point revisited in
the concluding section of the article). Yet as Le Billon (2011; see also
Kolstad and Søreide, 2009) shows, there are multiple entry points for
illicit financial flows (corruption, illegal exploitation, and tax evasion)
in the extractive sector. In the case of mining, as argued by the Ob-
servatory of Mining Conflicts in Latin America, “In boom periods,
windfall profits enable mining companies to obtain favours from na-
tional political actors, despite their meager contributions in royalties
and taxes. When mineral prices go bust, they lobby for weaker social
and environmental standards and for state subsidies through exemp-
tions from taxes and other obligations that every economic activity
should normally meet” (quoted by Moore, 2017).
The theme of the state as enabler and facilitator in the context of
global forces and flows is also germane to the case of land and water
grabs. Both land grabs and mining are linked to a circuit of investment
discourse and practice, whereby the perceived need for FDI is coupled
with “reform” that scales down protections for labour and harnesses
state infrastructural and financial contributions to private sector ex-
traction activities (Le Billon and Sommerville, 2017). Governments in
“grabbing” countries are often active protagonists, partly out of atten-
tion to domestic food security (regardless of the food sovereignty effects
on countries subject to grabs); state actions that facilitate such acqui-
sitions within their borders may reflect “unwavering faith in the role of
foreign investment in national economic development” (German,
Schoneveld, and Mwangi, 2011, p. 2) or potential gains for politically
connected local elites (Ansoms, 2011; Borras and Franco, 2012). Some
governments, such as Ethiopia's, have nationalized large tracts of land
only to resell to private interests, simultaneously forcing local farmers
and pastoralists onto unproductive land (Human Rights Watch, 2012).
A study of coerced dispossession from agricultural land (“grabbed
commons”) found that “most of the cases of conflict (including violent
and non-violent conflict) emerged when the land was acquired through
government lease, and such leases were mainly for large-scale crop
production” (Dell'Angelo et al., 2017b, p. 8).
It is also important to situate these issues with reference to corpo-
rate home countries and source countries for investment. For example,
the Canadian government, since the 1990s and across political party
lines, has facilitated extractive imperialism in Latin America and be-
yond, intertwining domestic corporate and foreign policy (Studnicki-
Gizbert, 2016; Veltmeyer, 2013). Domestically, the Canadian govern-
ment sustains the mining industry by providing favourable tax regimes,
including tax credits and subsidized equity financing, especially for
junior exploration firms operating both domestically and inter-
nationally.4 Further, Canada's lax securities laws create an environment
of lenient corporate governance, where until very recently lawsuits
against Canadian TNCs related to their activities outside Canada could
not be heard in Canadian courts (Dougherty, 2013). Internationally,
Canada officially promotes the mining industry via development pro-
jects and formal diplomatic channels, providing tacit and active support
for the nexus of undemocratic governance, military intervention, and
weak environmental and tax/royalty legislation throughout Latin
America (Gordon and Webber, 2016; Heidrich, 2016), which might be
dubbed “unhealthy diplomacy.”
In recent years between half and two-thirds of all mining TNCs have
been headquartered in Canada (Natural Resources Canada, 2018), with
59% of global mining financing passing through Toronto stock ex-
changes in 2017 (TMX, 2018). As such, the ethical, and legal, respon-
sibility of companies based in Canada and other high-income countries
(HICs) for the conduct of their subsidiaries and affiliates in LMICs is a
transcendent (health) issue in the realm of global extraction and global
governance for health more generally.
Yet the case of mining in Latin America is also instructive as an
antidote to fatalism (Bebbington et al., 2008; Conde, 2017; Kirsch,
2014; McDonell, 2015; Paredes, 2016). In 2013 the Chilean government
suspended and fined the massive open-pit Pascua-Lama gold mine (and
copper and silver projects) straddling the border with Argentina due to
investor Barrick Gold's environmental violations and company manip-
ulation of data on the contamination and depletion of fresh water
(Urkidi, 2010; Working Group, 2014). In the most notable and unlikely
initiative to date, in 2017 El Salvador—economically, politically, and
socially beleaguered by drug trafficking in the wake of a highly de-
structive civil war—passed a nationwide ban on metal mining
(MiningWatch, 2017b). This ban was enacted after El Salvador was
subject to a lengthy $300 million investor-state dispute settlement suit
for denying digging rights to Australian/Canadian conglomerate
Oceana Gold due to environmental assessment violations and con-
tamination of the country's principal drinking water source during
prospecting (Moore et al., 2014). Costa Rica also has a major mining
ban in place, and other Central and South American countries are
contemplating alternatives to “plunder extractivism” (Broad and
Fischer-Mackey, 2016). These efforts have not only challenged cen-
tralized government decision making processes but also galvanized
social movements to work with a variety of actors and institutions “to
reclaim the right of affected populations and indigenous peoples to
participate, in empowering forms, in high-stake decisions that affect
their territories, livelihoods and futures”(Walter and Urkidi, 2017, p.
265).
4 Canada is hardly the only home to mining TNCs—the United Kingdom, Australia, the
United States, and China are also major players, and many of the problems that have
arisen in Latin America have counterparts in Africa and elsewhere, albeit involving dif-
ferent protagonists. In sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, Australian mining companies
have the largest presence in terms of number of companies (Fitzgibbon et al., 2015).
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5. Pathways
As the next step in our analysis, we distinguish five generic path-
ways (Fig. 1) to demonstrate in greater detail the interconnections
among global political economy factors, national politics and institu-
tional/policy factors, and health outcomes. These are: 1) effects on
poverty and inequality; 2) workplace hazards; 3) environmental de-
gradation; 4) dispossession and loss of livelihoods; and 5) violence and
conflict. These involve both direct mechanisms, such as workplace and
environmental exposures, and indirect mechanisms linked to such
variables as the use of oil and mining revenues. There is also some
overlap among these categories, for example when environmental de-
gradation is associated both with exposures to hazardous contaminants
and with loss of livelihoods. Nonetheless, the pathways remain analy-
tically indispensable.
5.1. Effects on poverty and inequality
The presumption that growth associated with extractive industries
will create jobs and increase governments’ fiscal capacity (in theory
enabling increased investment in health systems and social protection)
is widespread, if often implicit. For example, the World Bank estimates
that in 2016, “IFC's oil, gas and mining client companies contributed
approximately US$2500 million to government revenues” (World Bank,
2017, p. 4) and “created or sustained about 60,000 direct jobs.” Even if
accurate, this indicates a modest employment contribution at best, and
it is a gross rather than a net figure; it does not take into account live-
lihoods lost as a result of the activities in question.
Given the pervasive influence of poverty on health, within and
across generations (Kelly et al., 2014), it is worth paying attention to
the 13 specific potential mechanisms linking extractive industries to
either poverty reduction or poverty exacerbation identified by Gamu
et al. (2015) based on an important review of empirical studies (see
Table 1); their provisional conclusion is that industrial mining is more
frequently associated with worsening poverty than with reducing it. In
one country, Peru, mining has been found to have positive economic
and social effects in districts where it actually takes place, but with few
spillovers outside the local area and with an “inequalizing impact …
both within and across districts” (Loayza and Rigolini, 2016, p. 219).
Elsewhere, with certain exceptions such as Norway, whose welfare state
predated its oil boom, extractive economies face difficulties in estab-
lishing strong welfare states (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013), such as in
Bolivia (Kröger and Lalander, 2016).
In Nigeria, Africa's largest oil exporter, official figures show a con-
sistent increase in poverty over more than three decades (UNDP, 2015,
p. 21–22), while oil wealth remains extremely concentrated (Wallis,
2014). In Angola, the continent's second largest oil exporter, the capital
Luanda ranks as the world's most expensive city (Ngugi, 2017) and
luxury amenities proliferate, while the poor live literally in the shadows
of the towers occupied by the rich and powerful (Lyons, 2016; Specter,
2015; UNICEF, 2015). This is a middle-income country, on World Bank
criteria, but one masking huge inequality: 30% of the population lived
below the World Bank's extreme poverty threshold in 2008, before the
oil price collapse. In 2016, post-collapse, professional auditors noted
that “[n]o less than 80% of the country's consumables are imported.
The National Bank has limited foreign currency; the Kwanza has de-
valued considerably, and the shelves in the shops are empty, while fuel
prices have gone up. Public services have been cut to reduce govern-
ment spend[ing], resulting in rubbish on the streets and a yellow fever
outbreak” (Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2016, p. 23; on the yellow fever
outbreak, concentrated in Luanda, see WHO, 2016). The Chad-Ca-
meroon pipeline appears actually to have increased poverty in the oil-
producing region of Chad (Aristide and Moundigbaye, 2017) despite
the World Bank's “unprecedented efforts designed to ensure that oil
revenues would be used for priority social investments in Chad” (Horta,
2010, p. 7; the World Bank financed the project through the IFC, but
eventually withdrew due to Chad's failure to comply with social in-
vestment measures).
5.2. Workplace hazards
Mining has had a deplorable occupational health record due to
miners’ ongoing exposure to carcinogens, lung-disease inducing dust,
toxic mercury vapour, and high rates of injury and death from under-
ground explosions, equipment failure, and mining collapse (Cartwright,
2016; Elgstrand et al., 2017). Despite the increasing use of robotics,
mining remains one of the world's most hazardous occupations in terms
of deaths and injuries per capita (International Labour Organization,
2017). Birn et al. (2017, pp. 94–95) present a case study of how sub-
standard working conditions, a legacy of apartheid, continuing high
levels of economic inequality, and reliance on migrant labour, have
contributed to persistently high levels of tuberculosis among South
African miners. Coal mining in India, Turkey, China, Russia, and else-
where is a key cause of lung ailments among miners and nearby po-
pulations due to high concentrations of particulate matter from ex-
tractive processes (Hota and Behera, 2015). Because miners are often
recruited to work in remote areas, they also face a range of health
problems linked to migrant work, including racialized exploitation,
human trafficking and underage employment, sexually transmitted in-
fections, and mental health and substance use problems (Carney and
Gushulak, 2016; Upadhyay and Ranjan, 2016).
Artisanal mining is notoriously unregulated and dangerous, with
extensive documentation of harm to miners and their families and
contamination of nearby land and waterways in many regions of the
world (Amnesty International, 2016; Armah et al., 2013; Awomeso
et al., 2017; de Souza et al., 2017; Salazar-Camacho et al., 2017; Xiao
et al., 2017). In addition to being deprived of education, child labourers
involved in gold artisanal mining, including in Mali, Tanzania, and
Ghana, report a range of respiratory and musculoskeletal symptoms
(Human Rights Watch, 2011, 2013, 2015).
Sand mining similarly entails serious, if insufficiently researched,
occupational health and safety hazards. The physically intensive nature
of manual sand mining, for instance, can bring about musculoskeletal
problems, ear and eye pain, and sensory deficits in hands and feet
(Mohapatra et al., 2017). In India, civil society groups have docu-
mented fatalities among divers who descend up to 120 feet underwater
Table 1
Candidate mechanisms linking mining, oil and gas extraction and changes in poverty (adapted from Gamu, Le Billon, and Spiegel, 2015).
Mechanisms tending to reduce poverty Mechanisms tending to increase poverty
1. Extractive industries as catalyst for growth 1. Economic underperformance of resource-rich economies
2. Revenues used to support increased investment in health care and education 2. Increased unemployment in other sectors as agricultural and manufacturing workers
displaced
3. Direct employment 3. Exacerbation of inequality
4. Upstream and downstream economic linkages 4. Employment volatility (the boom and bust cycle)
5. Private (i.e. corporate) investment in infrastructure 5. Economic enclaves
6. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives 6. Rent-seeking and corruption
7. Environmental and social impacts
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to collect sand (Rege, 2016).
In the case of agribusiness and land grabs, a seriously neglected
issue is worker exposure to pesticides associated with input-intensive
monocultures that often follow large-scale agricultural land acquisi-
tions by foreign actors. An estimated 3.5–5million poisonings and
250,000 deaths occur annually due to unsafe pesticide use (Marrs and
Karalliede, 2012), and there are substantial risks to human health from
pesticide contamination of water tables (Neto et al., 2014).
5.3. Environmental degradation
Mining operations typically leave behind a trail of devastation
(London and Kisting, 2016): open pits and stripped terrain; deadly
mudslides and water contamination; and improper disposal of mine
tailings that leads to seepage of heavy metals, cyanide, acids, and other
toxic by-products into land and rivers (Roche et al., 2017). In the
leaching processes used in large-scale gold mining, for example, cya-
nide solutions are sprayed onto mammoth piles of low-grade ore to
extract gold flakes. It can take up to 30 tons of ore to produce one ounce
of gold, a process which leaves behind huge quantities of cyanide-laced
tailings filling reservoirs that often leak and contaminate fish and water
supplies (Eisler and Wiemeyer, 2004). Mining of silver, copper (Latin
America is the leading producer of both of these), gold, zinc, tin, and
other naturally abundant minerals both consumes enormous quantities
of water and heavily contaminates watersheds and agricultural land.
Acids and heavy metals (cyanide, mercury, arsenic, etc.) that are im-
properly dumped cause extreme water and environmental stress in the
Peruvian highlands, El Salvador's main freshwater source (the Río
Lempa), and hundreds of other locales across the continent (e.g. on
Guatemala, see Basu and Hu, 2010). Artisanal mining is also implicated:
women in Indonesia, Kenya, and Myanmar have been found to suffer
from high mercury burden, most likely linked to small-scale gold
mining (via burning of mercury amalgam and water contamination of
fish stocks). Mercury's harmful effects (Minamata disease, notorious
from neurotoxic exposures in Japan and northern Ontario) include
brain damage, especially to the developing fetus, and kidney and car-
diovascular disease (Bell et al., 2017; Gibb and O'Leary, 2014).
Environmental devastation associated with oil and gas extraction in
sub-Saharan Africa is best documented in the Niger Delta, where it has
been estimated that in the 50 years before 2006 the volume of oil
spilled was equivalent to one Exxon Valdez spill every year, turning the
Delta into “one of the most oil-impacted ecosystems in the world”
(Federal Ministry of Environment et al., 2006). An extensive environ-
mental assessment in 2011 documented hazardous exposures to hy-
drocarbons in air pollution as well as widespread contamination of
surface and ground water with substances including benzene (a no-
torious carcinogen), and made numerous recommendations for urgent
action (UNEP, 2011). Five years later, an assessment of the effective-
ness of attempts at regulation found that of the 27 recommendations,
“only three (had) been partially implemented,” and blamed both “the
persistent lack of political will on the part of the Nigerian government,
and the grossly nonchalant attitude by Shell” (a subsidiary of Royal
Dutch Shell and the major private sector operator in the region)
(Yakubu, 2017).
A special concern in the Nigerian case is flaring: burning off at the
wellhead of natural gas that occurs in association with oil extraction
(Environmental Rights Action and Friends of the Earth Nigeria, 2005;
Izarali, 2016). Exposure to the multiple airborne contaminants asso-
ciated with flaring “is known to cause human health risks such as
cancer, neurological, reproductive and developmental effects” (Ite and
Ibok, 2013, p. 74). The volume of gas flared in recent years has de-
clined, but official deadlines aimed at ending the practice have re-
peatedly been missed or ignored (Orji, 2014), while the nature of the
health effects means that they will continue to manifest for many years,
perhaps intergenerationally. Health-damaging pollution has been ob-
served both in the oil-producing regions of Chad and on the
Cameroonian coast (Horta, 2012, pp. 218–19), although little detail is
available. Indeed, limited availability of research on the environmental
and health effects of oil and gas extraction in sub-Saharan Africa is an
ongoing problem.5
Sand mining threatens water security and quality by depleting
groundwater around rivers (Sreebha and Padmalal, 2011; UNEP, 2014),
especially affecting women in settings where they have the primary
responsibility of securing water for their households (Pereira and
Ratnayake, 2013). Access to safe drinking water is also endangered by
mining of coastal dunes, which are natural barriers preventing salt
water intrusion into freshwater aquifers (Jonah et al., 2015; Padmalal
and Maya, 2014). Furthermore, this practice also generates inland
erosion of riverbanks and forest degradation from sand mining beneath
and around forests. Abandoned mining pits collect rainwater, becoming
mosquito breeding grounds that facilitate the spread of malaria and
other vector-borne diseases (Adedeji et al., 2014). Sand mining is also
implicated in climate change, with the cement industry accounting for
5% of all global CO2 emissions (even before accounting for the emis-
sions from sand transportation) (Rubenstein, 2012).
5.4. Loss of livelihoods and dispossession
Adequate nutrition is, of course, one of the most basic social de-
terminants of health. Effects of land grabs on food security and sover-
eignty vary widely depending on the local context, but in particular
when croplands that are already in production are acquired, “[t]he loss
of cropland to a large investor has a direct impact on the food security
and livelihood strategies of the smallholder farmers affected. … Land
considered to be ‘marginal’ often serves as a grazing area and is im-
portant to rural communities and indigenous peoples” (Nolte et al.,
2016, p. 36). Because land acquisitions often entail a change in land use
from local food production to agricultural exports, land grabs can
“exclude the local population from the access to potentially highly
productive agricultural land that, even without major investments,
could produce enough food to sustain about 190–235 (minimum
number depending on the diet) million people” (Rulli and D'Odorico,
2014, p. 7). This is not a direct measure of the increased domestic food
insecurity associated with land acquisitions for export but is an im-
portant indication of scale, and from an equity perspective “vulnerable
communities within vulnerable countries (i.e. those most impacted by
changes in food prices) are also those more susceptible to livelihood
loss due to the land rush” (Davis et al., 2014, p. 188). Additional issues
involve loss of forester livelihoods and biodiversity, for example as
forests are cleared to make way for biofuel or palm oil plantations.
Sub-Saharan Africa is the world's lowest-income region, and low
agricultural productivity is an ongoing concern. It is therefore sig-
nificant that Africa is also the most targeted continent for land grabs,
with land deals since 2000 comprising more than 10 million hectares,
despite what has been described as a “looming crisis” of arable land
availability in the continent (Gettleman, 2017), with disturbing im-
plications for future food sovereignty. Further, due to their capital-in-
tensive methods, the agricultural practices associated with “grabbed”
land tend to create few employment opportunities that generate local
income (Nolte et al., 2016, p. 46; see also Aguilar-Støen, 2016; Borras
and Franco, 2013), and in fact may follow on various forms of coerced
dispossession (Dell'Angelo et al., 2017a, b), thus concentrating the ne-
gative impact of land grabs among the most vulnerable.
A further set of potential health consequences arises from the virtual
5 Conducting even basic fieldwork or epidemiological studies is difficult (Baumüller
et al., 2011, p. 17), and official statistics can be unreliable or concealed. The author of one
of the few fieldwork-based monographs on oil industry impacts notes: “Eventually a
uniquely forthright [Angolan] government official told me that all statistics are con-
sidered politically charged. He divulged the government's fear that information on topics
ranging from environmental emissions to basic population statistics by province could be
used to criticize the ruling party” (Reed, 2009, p. 13).
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water trade that is part and parcel of land grabs, which may affect water
security as local water resources are diverted, depleted, and ultimately
alienated for export production (Franco et al., 2013). Concentration of
land deals along the River Nile, the Senegal River, and the Niger River
suggests that water access motivates acquisitions in some regions (Nolte
et al., 2016, p. 17; on the ongoing contests over water in the Nile basin
see Andrews-Speed et al., 2015, pp. 147–158).
Beyond the direct health damages resulting from extraction, en-
vironmental degradation and land displacement also jeopardize
farming, fisheries and forestry, particularly affecting Indigenous liveli-
hoods and lands. High levels of poverty and losses of livelihood asso-
ciated with pollution that disproportionately affect the poorest fishers
have been documented in oil-producing regions of Angola (Reed,
2009), although little detail is available. In the Andes, mining-related
contamination and depletion of water has negatively affected agri-
culture and livestock raising. As well, (forced) displacement of farmers
by mining companies onto smaller plots or into towns has shrunk
communal grazing lands and threatened land-based livelihoods (Brain,
2017; Helwege, 2015).
In the case of sand mining, rich topsoil is removed for sand ex-
traction, harming the agricultural viability of land and farmers’ liveli-
hoods (Adedeji et al., 2014). For commercial and subsistence fishing,
sand mining's impact on coastal erosion is a major issue: it increases
rock exposure on the coast, making it difficult to launch and land
fishing boats. Additionally, the availability of fish is affected by eco-
system damage to habitats and spawning grounds and by water pollu-
tion brought on by sand dredging (Adesina and Adunola, 2017; Global
Witness, 2010; Kim and Grigalunas, 2009; Sowunmi et al., 2016).
Furthermore, the aesthetic devastation to beaches caused by extensive
mining hurts coastal tourism—yet another source of livelihood in many
settings (Jonah et al., 2015).
Intertwined with, but also going beyond, the material dimensions of
loss of livelihood, the health effects of social dislocation must be con-
sidered with reference to the important synthesis by Whitehead et al.
(2016) of evidence on how lack of “control over destiny” generates
negative health outcomes across multiple scales, including at the macro
level through “traumatic social transitions”. Expulsion and disposses-
sion are particularly linked to the systematic oppression of Indigenous
populations, whose lands and territories are especially targeted for their
mineral riches, which are abundant in part thanks to their rural and
remote location and longstanding non-depleting uses of land and water
resources consistent with Indigenous ways of life (Caxaj et al., 2012;
Gordon and Webber, 2008). In the Philippines archipelago, for in-
stance, more than half of locales identified in mining applications are in
Indigenous areas (Holden et al., 2011).
5.5. Violence and conflict
The dispossession of land and livelihoods linked to extractive de-
velopment has long been accompanied by violent government, para-
military, and private security firm suppression of activist opposition
(Imai, 2017; Middeldorp et al., 2016; Spring, 2016). In Guatemala in
the 1960s, a subsidiary of Canada's International Nickel Company
(INCO) obtained military support to forcibly remove thousands of In-
digenous residents to secure a mine, leading to 3000–6000 deaths (Fox,
2015). Across Latin America, deaths threats and extreme human rights
violations—perhaps most egregiously in Colombia (Rochlin,
2015)—have involved killings at protests and demonstrations, crim-
inalization of dissent, as well as targeted assassinations, under the di-
rection or tacit approval by mining companies and national govern-
ments. The Observatory of Mining Conflicts in Latin America
(Observatorio de Conflictos Mineros de América Latina, 2017) docu-
ments 219 current mining conflicts in Latin America, affecting over 330
overwhelmingly Indigenous communities. In recent decades, thousands
of environmental activists have been killed across the region (Watts and
Vidal, 2017). Worldwide, the civil society organization Global Witness
(2016, 2017; Watts, 2018) recorded 185 killings of environmental ac-
tivists in 2015, 201 in 2016, and 197 in 2017 (opponents of mining and
oil activity were the largest targeted category in 2015 and 2016, while
agribusiness and mining opponents were the most targeted in 2017).
The civil society organization MiningWatch Canada has tracked hun-
dreds of human rights complaints against Barrick Gold, the world's largest
gold mining TNC. Barrick's mine in Papua New Guinea has been linked to
excessive use of force by the mine's security staff, and the rape and gang
rape of over 100 women, and its Tanzania mine is linked with targeted
killing of artisanal miners and activists (MiningWatch Canada, 2017a). In
India, “sand mafias” involving corporate (mining and construction com-
panies), political, and law enforcement actors employ intimidation tactics
and violence (including assassination) against activists, other officials, and
villagers who threaten the operation of illegal sand mining operations
(Beiser, 2015; Martínez-Alier et al., 2014; Rege, 2016).
Beyond these effects is the frequency of brutal conflict over mineral
resource control, most notably in the First and Second Congo wars in
the late 1990s and 2000s in the DRC, during which more than five
million people died. Fighting was exacerbated by competition over
control of lucrative gold, tin, diamond, uranium, copper, zinc, and co-
balt deposits, involving both national and TNC interests (van
Reybrouck, 2014). A UN Security Council Panel of Experts (2003) found
that the commercial activities of over 100 transnational mining com-
panies contributed to and benefited from the DRC wars, but Canada,
Australia and other OECD governments where mining companies are
based have failed to investigate the role of these corporations in the
conflict (Kneen, 2009).
6. Into the future: Understanding and addressing/challenging the
global extractive order
Our case examples illustrate multiple pathways between extractive
industries and (largely negative) health outcomes via a range of societal
determinants of health, from workplace and environmental exposures
to illicit outflows of profits. Most obviously, an urgent need exists for
multidisciplinary health research that describes in greater, context-
specific detail the direct and indirect health effects of what might be
called a global extractive order. The extraction of multiple commod-
ities, the ones studied here and many others, routinely proceeds in a
way that is essentially predatory under conditions of neoliberal globa-
lization. Conventionally, the power asymmetry most often noted is that
between TNCs—with their abundant finances, technological sophisti-
cation, and access to global commodity chains—and national govern-
ments of LMICs. But even greater asymmetries exist between corporate-
governmental alliances (in both HICs and LMICs) and the local com-
munities affected by the “structural violence” of resource extraction, a
prime example being the political and legal privileging of (foreign)
investor rights over local community livelihoods in Colombia and Brazil
(Srikantia, 2016).
It is important to note, as well, the elision of conventional North-
South distinctions: many land grabs manifest an “emerging ‘North-
South-South’ dynamic” (Land Deal Politics Initiative, 2012; see also
Rulli et al., 2013). For example governments in China, South Africa,
and several countries in the Middle East or companies based in those
countries are actively involved in land acquisitions; companies based in
Brazil and India, among other settings, are originating acquisitions
while at the same time land in those countries is being acquired by
foreign actors. And TNCs based in the Global South do not necessarily
make more ethical players than their Northern counterparts, as shown
by the actions of Brazilian mega-mining corporation Vale in settings as
distinct as Mozambique and Northern Ontario, where it has pursued a
heavy-handed policy against unions and labour laws and given short
shrift to safety measures, resulting in soaring fatalities (Marshall, 2015).
Future research on the global extractive order and health must draw
on country- and region-specific expertise that often resides far outside
the conventional remit of health research to identify homologies among
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superficially dissimilar contexts and industries. The ideal would be a
program that included a sophisticated mapping component to enable
visualized worldwide tracking of where extraction takes place, for what
purposes, to be traded where, and affecting the health of whom (and
how), as well as the political economy underpinnings in terms of
tracking ownership, financial flows, and special impacts on Indigenous
populations. Much of this information is available but is scattered
through a multitude of sources, and commodity-by-commodity pre-
sentation tends to inadequately convey the contours of the extractive
order and its associated systemic imbalances. Another central issue for
future research involves analysis of how deeply intertwined the ex-
tractive order is with militarism and war: violent conflict is, arguably,
often essential to extraction (Downey et al., 2010; Le Billon, 2013).
Conversely, natural resource revenue sharing mechanisms may enable
lasting peace in areas beset by resource conflicts (Le Billon and
Nicholls, 2007).
To be most effective, such a research program would need to be
backed with the resources and infrastructure for secure contact with the
public-interest civil society organizations that, in many regions, provide
or possess the best source of data on extractive industries—often at
considerable personal risk. Yet reliance on civil society brings its own
dilemmas. As valuable as civil society has been in pressing for a variety
of instruments seeking to govern TNCs, civil society should not be ex-
pected to shoulder the burden of holding extractive interests to account,
or to replace the roles of UN agencies and national/subnational gov-
ernments in protecting populations and the environment from harm,
and promoting health and well-being (Birn et al., 2017, pp. 603–645),
especially given the high and sometimes fatal costs of doing so.
Exploring the potential for global initiatives to address the gov-
ernance and health challenges presented by the global extractive order
would require another article (in progress). Important in this context
are proposals to address the shortcomings of existing governance me-
chanisms not only through a variety of measures to control corruption
(e.g. Siegle, 2009), but also through such instruments as a treaty on
business and human rights that would, for example, close loopholes
around complex corporate structures that fail to hold parent companies
accountable for the human rights abuses of their subsidiaries (Correa,
2016). These and other initiatives must also confront fundamental
questions related both to political accountability and to the structure of
the current global extractive order. Such questions raise the issue of
whether the primary focus should be on particularly pernicious players
and venal practices (the “few bad eggs” approach), while the overall
structures and rules enabling “big extraction” remain in place and
business continues as usual, or whether the challenge is rather one of
developing entirely new, more equitable alternatives to the current
extractive order and associated distributions of harm and benefits?
The most basic governance issues—those of accountability and
transparency— are addressed by Siegle's argument for “the normative
principle that natural resource revenues belong to all citizens of the
endowed country,” with the corollary that “the norm that all natural
resource contracts must be ratified by democratic legislatures” should
be instituted and promoted by international institutions (2009, pp.
49–50). Similarly, Wenar (2008, p. 15) argues that: “The most salient
reform of international commerce must be to remove the ‘might makes
right’ rule that vests the right to sell resources in whoever can control a
population by force,” or via a variety of autocratic and unaccountable
institutions. The extent of the contrast between such norms, however
unexceptionable they may seem, and the current state of the world is
hard to overstate. More promising, perhaps—and especially intriguing
in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)— is
Schuppert's (2014) proposal for an International Court for the En-
vironment that balances claims for self-determination with responsi-
bilities in terms of such principles as doing “no harm, precaution,
equitable use, sustainable use, sustainable development, and inter-
generational equity,” and the polluter pays principle (p. 90).
Yet even if formidable political obstacles can be overcome, are the
health dimensions of the extractive order sufficiently addressed by
adherence to equity principles and better control of environmental and
workplace exposures, tax and royalty regimes that return more re-
sources to national treasuries, and routine transparency with regard to
revenue structures and capital flight? (The world order is admittedly a
long way from achieving any of these.) Or is the issue rather one of
designing structures of global governance and accountability that
change entire industries, in ways analogous (and complementary) to
the necessary transition to a low- or post-carbon economy?
In this vein, what are the implications of the argument that growth
in the global economy's overall throughput of resources must be mod-
erated, if not reversed, in order to keep a variety of biospheric life
support mechanisms that are essential to health from being destroyed
(Steffen et al., 2015)? A growing chorus of analysts argue that there is
now ample evidence demonstrating that today's extractive order is
sufficiently destructive of health that the entire premise of the global
economy needs to be rethought and revolutionized according to a re-
lationship of harmony and equity among and across peoples and the
natural world (see e.g. D'Alisa et al., 2015; Demaria et al., 2013;
Villalba, 2013). Or if a reformist approach is all that can be mustered,
what resource throughputs, extractive activities, and re-usability me-
chanisms are ethically acceptable while being consistent with the eco-
nomic distribution (and/or growth) needed to meet such SDG targets as
eliminating extreme poverty and reducing multidimensional poverty by
2030? How compatible are current patterns of land acquisition and
crop exports with the multiple targets related to ending hunger? (These
are just examples.) Against this background, and above and beyond the
importance of national-level political reforms, what would a minimally
adequate mechanism for equitable global governance for health of the
extractive order look like? These are larger questions than the ones
raised in this article, but they cannot be ignored.
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